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In contrast to U.S. studies, we show that Australian short sellers do not front-run and profit 
after insider sales.  Results are robust to conditional trading classified by book-to-market, 
intangible ratios, industry and multiple factor analysis.  A combination of insider sales and 
short selling provides a contrarian signal that dampens prior overpricing, but is not associated 
with subsequent abnormal returns.  We contend that the commercial and legal environment in 
Australia, together with the daily reporting of short sales, plays a significant role in 
restraining short selling profitability.  Our results contradict front-running by short sellers in 
the U.S., that is explained by a business environment that induces the leakage of pre-traded 
negative information by corporate insiders.  Overall, we highlight how information flow 
direction and profitability can be affected by different country legal and business cultures.   
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1. Introduction 
Prior studies examine the selling by well-informed market actors such as corporate insiders 
(Beneish and Vargus, 2002; Ali et al., 2011) and short sellers (Desai et al., 2006).  Short 
sellers and corporate insiders (directors, senior management) derive their trading advantage 
from access to information not generally available to the investing public.  Hence, their 
individual trading represents a potential leading signal for negative information cues.   
In this paper, we study the combined and conditional trading behaviour of short 
sellers around corporate insider sales in Australia.  Specifically, we examine whether short 
sellers trade ahead, or follow, corporate insider sales.  We find that Australian corporate 
insiders significantly provide the trading lead with short sellers, in the main, undertaking 
mimic trades.  Short sellers focus on large insider sales and results are robust to conditional 
trading classified by market-to-book, intangible ratios, and industry.  The only exception is 
front-running by short sellers in firms with a large positive accrual component in earnings.  
Our final analyses show that sell trading by insiders and short traders does not result in 
abnormal profits, but provides a contrarian signal that stabilises prior strong price increases. 
These results contrast with a recent U.S. study by Khan and Lu (2013) who report that 
short sellers provide the major price information lead by front-running the trading of 
corporate insiders.  There are several reasons to explain this directional trading reversal that 
include disparities in business culture, litigation risk and reporting requirements.  First, short 
selling and information content in Australia is not as intensive.  The proportion of short 
volume is 24% and 31% of the trading volume for NYSE and NASDAQ stocks (Diether et al., 
2009), compared to a short ratio of 13.29% in Australia (Do and Gray, 2011).  Second, under 
Australian Regulatory Guide 196 (hereafter, RG196), short selling is highly visible with the 
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requirement to report on a daily basis.1  This compares with insider trades that have up to one 
week to report.  Consequently, this weakens the incentive for short sellers to undertake costly 
information search and provides a constraint on their trading advantage (per Kyle, 1995).   
The reporting requirements and litigation environment in the U.S. reverse the trading 
incentives of insiders.  Short sales to the SEC can be reported on a delayed one month basis, 
but insider’ sales must be reported within two business days.  Moreover, in the U.S. corporate 
insiders face higher litigation risk which increases reluctance to profit and risk public 
exposure through the lodgement of a Form 4 on EDGAR (Huddart et al., 2007).  
Consequently, this provides U.S. insiders with a greater incentive to leak or tip negative 
information to short sellers before they trade (Campbell et al., 1993; Christophe et al., 2010; 
Khan and Lu, 2013).  Finally, price related information contained in insider sales in the U.S. 
is difficult to decode (Cohen et al. 2012), consistent with a high concentration of liquidity 
and/or rebalancing trades from executive salary perquisites (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001).   
We follow Khan and Lu (2013) by dissecting our sample into large, medium and 
small insider trades and analyse accounting ratios as indicators of possible trading asymmetry.  
We add a methodological improvement by using RG196 to track actual daily short sales 
rather than using short selling potential (i.e. lendable shares) or monthly measures to estimate 
the competition from short sellers (per Khan and Lu, 2013; Massa et al., 2015).2  Real time 
short sales data is hand collected and this allows us to more efficiently trace, on a micro basis, 
the inter-temporal daily transfer of information.   
Our paper contributes in several ways.  This is the first Australian study to 
contemporaneously extract negative price discovery from two trading sources and to show 
                                                          
1 Appendix 1 summarises recent legislation and operational changes made by RG196. 
2 RG196 provides a rich data base that is not available in other countries.  Do and Gray (2011) document the 
data reporting and research advantages of Australian short selling compared to the U.S., U.K., Hong Kong, 
Canada and Japan. 
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how business environment can affect information flow direction.  We show that abnormal 
short sales peak on the day, and day after, large insider sales and in combination provide a 
halt to prior price run-ups.  Our study also affirms the importance of conditioning informed 
selling and in anchoring on accounting numbers.  Results are informative to investors in 
revealing that short selling accelerates price discovery by aiding in the reduction of 
overpricing, consistent with Diamond and Verrechia (1987); Chen and Rhee (2010); and 
Beber and Pagano (2013).  Improved investor equity is also evidenced by increased 
competition from short sellers that restricts the ability of insiders to rent extract through 
stealth trading.  In this regard, RG196 likely plays a significant role through rapid one day 
reporting.     
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses, 
Section 3 describes the data sources and research methodology, and Section 4 reports the 
results.  Section 5 undertakes further analyses and reports multiple factor and trading 
profitability results and Section 6 concludes the paper.      
2. Background Motivation and Hypotheses Development 
2.1  Do short sellers front-run insider sales? 
Our first research question focusses on which informed trader provides the superior negative 
information lead to the market.  It is well documented that corporate insider purchases in the 
U.S. contain superior information about a firm’s future prospects (Seyhun, 1992; Lustgarten 
and Mande, 1999; Aboody and Lev, 2000; Ke et al., 2003; Ali et al., 2011; Badertscher et al., 
2011; Hillier et al., 2015; Gider and Westheide, 2016).  This is not so much the case for 
insider selling which tends to consist of non-information based liquidity and rebalancing 
trades from executive salary perquisites (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001).  However, Cohen et al. 
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(2012), show that non-routine inside sales contain price sensitive information, but they are 
more likely to attract the ire of stockholders and the adverse attention of litigators.   
Short sellers are also considered particularly well informed (Drake et al., 2011).  They 
are consistently profitable in identifying overvalued stocks (Diamond and Verrechia, 1987; 
Chen and Rhee, 2010; Karpoff and Lou, 2010; Beber and Pagano, 2013), and they front-run 
price sensitive announcements (Berkman and McKenzie, 2012; Engel et al., 2012), earnings 
announcements (Christophe et al., 2004; Feng and Chan, 2016), analyst downgrades 
(Christophe et al., 2010), and negative earnings restatements and financial misconduct (Desai 
et al., 2006; Karpoff and Lou, 2010).  Importantly, they do not have the same internal firm 
and regulatory constraints that are imposed on corporate insiders.   
We develop hypotheses that examine the trading interaction between these two 
informed competitors.  In doing so we build on Khan and Lu (2013), who argue that short 
sellers in the U.S. front-run because: (i) they have a dominant information set, or (ii) insider 
sellers strategically delay trading in order to mitigate legal jeopardy from regulatory attention 
(see also Huddart et al., 2007).   
We note that (ii) does not preclude corporate insiders from possessing a superior 
volume of asymmetric negative information.  Christophe et al. (2010) say they do, arguing 
that front-running by short sellers arises, not from information search, but from direct tipping 
by corporate insiders (Khan and Lu, 2013).  Campbell et al. (1993) contend that the primary 
reason for insider tipping is to mitigate problems induced by a litigious U.S. corporate 
environment.  From an insider’s perspective the tipping to short sellers increases trading 
liquidity, raising the possibility of stealth trading (Kyle, 1985), and supports the argument 
that insiders are trading on publicly known information—reducing the possibility of 
attracting regulatory, shareholder, and unwanted media attention.   
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Khan and Lu (2013) add a trading volume caveat and document that short sellers trade 
strategically by only front-running the information content of large insider sales.  According 
to Hillier and Marshall (2002) and Fidrmuc et al. (2006) higher insider trading volume 
reflects a stronger belief about future direction, and Seyhun (1986) and Scott and Xu (2004) 
report that large insider sales are associated with negative abnormal returns.  Hence, if an 
insider is more likely to reveal his/her asymmetric negative information through a large trade, 
there is a greater tendency to pre-leak information to a limited clientele and then trade on the 
increased liquidity. To observe a more clear interaction between insiders and short sellers, we 
focus on large insider sales.3  
The above highlights several factors that might determine the direction of the 
information lead channel: (i) the extent of informed short selling, (ii) the degree of legal 
jeopardy from inside selling, and (iii) the information content contained in insider selling.  In 
the U.S. legal jeopardy concerns dominate and, if this is the case in Australia, then:  
Hypothesis 1 (Front-running Hypothesis):  Short selling front-runs large insider sales.   
In framing directional front-running hypotheses there is competing tension in 
expectations of the comparative timing and trading ability of insiders and short sellers.  The 
short selling front-running hypothesis may only reflect a U.S. commercial scenario.  Other 
countries are less litigious and they report a greater price reaction content from insider selling.  
For example, in Spain (Brio et al., 2002), in Germany (Betzer and Theissen, 2009), in 
Australia (Brown et al. (2003); Hodgson and van Praag, 2006), and in the Hong Kong stock 
market (Firth et al., 2011).  Moreover, in Australia, the requirement to report short sales 
                                                          
3 Defined as the top 30 percent of insider sales as a percent of firm market value in the full sample. We find that 
short sellers concentrate on trading around large insider sales but virtually ignore other trades.  We also repeat 
analyses for medium and small insider sales, defined as middle 40 percent and bottom 30 percent, with 
insignificant results. 
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within one day (RG196), as we predict would rapidly reduce comparative incentives for 
private information search by short sellers. 
Hence, if corporate insiders are directly more informed, the less litigious Australian 
environment does not induce insiders to leak information before trading, and the short seller’s 
information advantage is rapidly diffused, then corporate insiders in Australia would provide 
the dominant information lead.  This leads to our second hypothesis that short sellers wait on 
information cues and mimic corporate insider sales in Australia: 
Hypothesis 2 (Mimicking Hypothesis):  Short selling mimics large insider sales. 
2.2  Do short sellers front-run on public accounting information? 
Our second research question seeks to answer whether there are specific publicly available 
circumstances when short sellers front-run and when they mimic?  Khan and Lu (2013) focus 
on accounting variables as important inputs into pricing.  They hypothesise and report that 
high R&D, poor earnings announcements and loss frequency attract a heightened degree of 
front-running.  However, this is somewhat counter intuitive at first glance.  Corporate insiders 
have direct access to accounting ratios, audit reports and accounting quality.  Moreover, in 
situations where opaque financial information is in the public domain (and yet fully priced), 
we conjecture that insiders retain a comparative private advantage that is less likely to attract 
undue media and regulatory attention.  In these circumstances short sellers, given lower 
comparative advantage, would then mimic.  However, in a competitive information 
environment, if a short seller’s trading advantage derives from a macro based ability to trade 
on a broader based (comparative) industry information set, then they would provide the lead 
(Khan and Lu, 2013).   
Taking into consideration the Australian commercial environment that tends to allow 
corporate insiders to retain their asymmetric information advantage, our expectation is that 
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short sellers will mimic, rather than front-run, large accounting based trades.  We focus on 
accounts that tend to be opaque to outside investors by examining the high/low extremities of 
book-to-market, intangible and accrual ratios.   
Accounting opaqueness 
There is ample empirical evidence that corporate insiders conditionally trade on accounting 
subjectivity (Beneish and Vargus, 2002; Ke et al., 2003; Hodgson and van Praag, 2006), and 
a growing literature that short sellers trade on accounting reports.  For example, short selling 
activity increases prior to periods of disappointing earnings (Christophe et al., 2004), short 
sellers target firms with earnings restatements (Efendi at al., 2005), and high short trading 
predicts negative abnormal returns (Asquith and Meulbroek, 1995; Desai at al., 2002).   
Book-to-market ratios are a combination of observed market price and the aggregate 
components of book values that comprise disparate valuation methods generally obscure to 
outsiders.  Whilst, market prices are readily observable, net book values are not, and may 
consist of overvalued assets or undervalued liabilities.  The opacity of value stocks, (high 
book-to-market ratios), tends to be confined to asset value estimation.  On the other hand, 
growth firms (low book-to-market ratios) with accelerated sales and rapid expansion, attract a 
higher degree of investor attention.  This in turn increases the potential for uninformed 
trading with the market more generally overvaluing growth firms (see De Bondt and Thaler, 
1985; Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; Dechow et al., 2001).   
Our expectations are that, because of the mixture of untimely book values and the 
possibility of market overreaction, then low book-to-market ratios would attract the greater 
pricing errors.  Hence, due to greater private knowledge of real asset values and related 
market pricing, we hypothesise that corporate insiders have a greater fundamental 
understanding of valuation impacts, and short sellers will time their trades relative to insiders.  
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However, there is also the possibility that high book values constitute over-valuation.  
Accordingly, we examine both possibilities: 
Hypothesis 3 (Value/Growth Hypothesis):  Short selling mimics large insider sales in 
extreme high and extreme low book-to-market firms.4  
The next two hypotheses specifically concentrate on the conditional trading associated 
with two accounting ratios that are well known to contain elements of internal management 
subjectivity.   
We first target the reporting of intangibles.  Intangible valuation is highly subjective, 
the financial impact is heterogeneous across industry and firms, and they suffer from 
considerable endogeneity problems that make it difficult for any outsider to disentangle direct 
and indirect value effects (Hodgson et al., 2017).  In this regard, the level of reported 
intangibles within firms contributes to considerable information asymmetry and a private 
trading advantage to insiders (Aboody and Lev, 2000).  Whilst,  Khan and Lu (2013) report 
that short sellers both front-run and mimic insiders who trade on R&D expenses in the U.S., 
due to the commercial conditions that do not provide insiders incentives for information 
tipping in Australia, we do not conjecture short sellers’ front-run.   
Consequently, with a greater difficulty involved in deciphering information from 
intangibles, there is greater incentive for short sellers to track insider trades in firms with high 
levels of intangibles.  We therefore hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 4 (Intangible Hypothesis):  Short selling mimics large insider sales in extreme 
intangible rich firms.  
                                                          
4 Defined as the top (bottom) 30 percent, respectively, based on the firm’s relevant ratio in the sample of large 
insider sales. 
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Finally, it is also well known that high levels of accruals are associated with valuation 
mispricing with the general market unable to distinguish between the lower persistence of 
accruals compared to higher persistence of cash flows embedded in earnings (Sloan, 1996).  
Beneish and Vargus (2002) further show that the persistence of income increasing accruals is 
lower when accompanied by insider sales.  Desai et al. (2006) and Khan and Lu (2013) 
examine the effects of accruals on short selling behaviour and similarly find higher abnormal 
short selling in firms with high accruals.  But not all high accrual levels are bad news.  
Accruals are potential future cash flows and high levels may signal increased economic well-
being that is accompanied by insider buying (Hodgson and van Praag, 2006). 
Therefore, similar to intangibles, our accrual hypothesis follows the logic that 
deciphering information from internally generated accruals provides insiders with a 
comparative advantage in Australia.  Therefore, the greater incentive for short sellers is to 
track insider selling in firms with high levels of accruals.  We therefore hypothesise: 
Hypothesis 5 (Accrual Hypothesis):  Short selling mimics large insider sales in high accrual 
firms. 
3. Data and Method 
3.1 Data 
After the global financial crisis (GFC), the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) implement a temporary short selling ban on all stocks in the Australian 
market.  The ban on covered short selling was lifted on non-financial stocks in November 
2008 and on financial stocks in May 2009. To date, the ban on naked short selling is still in 
place.5  The new regulatory guide on short selling RG196 requires short transactions and 
                                                          
5 Covered short selling refers to the case where the stock must be borrowed first before a short sale can proceed. 
Naked short selling denotes the case of selling a stock without the need to borrow it first. However, the stock 
has to be delivered on the settlement date. Failure to do so results in a ‘failure-to-deliver’. 
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short positions to be reported on a daily basis.  Facilitated by the increased reporting 
frequency, we hand collected short selling data for the period January 2010 to March 2013 
from the daily gross short sales reports released by the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX).  
Average short sales on the day of insider trading was 0.03% of shares outstanding (Table 2) 
with average abnormal short sales volume 0.0095% (Figure 1). 
The insiders considered in this study are corporate directors.  The data on directors’ 
transactions on Australian stocks is sourced from Directors Deals over the same period.  The 
data includes the transaction date, announcement date, type of financial instrument traded, 
identity of the director, nature of ownership, transaction type, and share price and volume for 
each transaction.  To identify the position held by the insiders, we match the identity of the 
insiders against the corporate governance data obtained from the Securities Industry Research 
Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA).  Where the position held by the insiders is ambiguous or not 
included in the corporate governance data, we hand collected the insider’s position from the 
company’s annual financial reports or the company’s website as per the year of the 
transaction.  
We apply the following filtering criteria.  First, insider purchase only days are 
excluded and sales only days retained.  Any sales that are accompanied with purchases on the 
same day are netted off. Second, we restrict the trading window period to twenty one days 
where the insider sale was accompanied by short selling—ten days before any insider sale 
and ten days afterwards.  Third, incomplete, missing or obviously erroneous trades are 
removed.  Next, we truncate the trades that are not in the open market and exclude the trades 
that are associated with the exercising of options, security lending and takeover agreements.  
Finally, we eliminate insiders that are not directors after matching against corporate 
governance data.  In the case that multiple trades are conducted by directors in the same firm 
and on the same day, the number of shares sold are aggregated and counted as a single 
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observation.  We extract a final sample of 1,039 insider sale events.  Table 1 documents the 
sample filtering process. 
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
3.2 Method 
To test our trading based hypotheses we follow Khan and Lu (2013) by employing an event 
based study method, and defining the event day [0] as the day of an insider sale transaction.6  
The test window is set at [-10, +10] trading days around the event day and the estimation 
window used for calculating the expected level of short sales is [-60, -11] trading days 
(Christophe et al., 2004).  
The expected level of short sales during the estimation window is computed as:  
𝐸(𝑆ℎ𝑛) =  
1
𝐽
 ∑ 𝑆ℎ𝑗,𝑛,
𝑗=−11
𝑗=−60
                                                      (1) 
where 𝐸(𝑆ℎ𝑛) is the expected level of daily short sales for insider sale n; 𝑆ℎ𝑗,𝑛 is the gross 
short sales (expressed as a percentage of shares outstanding) for insider sale n on day j; and 𝐽 
is the number of days in the estimation window.  The abnormal short sales for a given insider 
sale n in the test window is then calculated as: 
𝑒𝑖,𝑛 =  𝑆ℎ𝑖,𝑛 − 𝐸(𝑆ℎ𝑛),                                                        (2) 
where 𝑒𝑖,𝑛 is the abnormal short sales for insider sale n on day i and 𝑆ℎ𝑖,𝑛 is the gross short 
sales for insider sale n on day i.  To observe the short selling pattern around insider sales, we 
proceed to aggregate all the abnormal short sales across all firm-events for each day in the 
test window: 
                                                          
6 We also considered the date of insider sales disclosure as a primary event. However, the date of insider sales is 
considered to be the more important foci given information flow is based on transactions and the possibility of 
broker information leakage.  
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𝐸𝑁(𝑒𝑖) =  
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝑒𝑖,𝑛,
𝑁
𝑁=1
                                                         (3) 
where 𝐸𝑁(𝑒𝑖) is the average abnormal short sales on event day i and 𝑁 is the number of firm 
events (i.e. 1,039 insider sale events in our full sample).  Statistical significance is inferred 
using a standard t-test, calculated as:  
                       𝑡𝐸𝑁(𝑒𝑖) =  
 𝐸𝑁(𝑒𝑖)
𝜎(𝐸𝑁(𝑒𝑖))
√𝑁
,                                                        (4) 
where 𝑡𝐸𝑁(𝑒𝑖)  is the t-statistic for the average abnormal short sales on event day i and 
𝜎(𝐸𝑁(𝑒𝑖)) is the standard deviation of the average abnormal short sales on event day i.   
4. Descriptive Statistics and Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 Panel A presents the summary statistics for the full sample of 1,039 firm-events.  The 
mean market value of firm is $1.9 billion with the median only $152 million, indicating that 
most of the firms in the sample are relatively small.  On average, the shares sold by directors 
and short sellers represent respectively 0.97% and 0.03% of firms’ shares outstanding.  Firms 
are likely to be growth firms according to the median of market-to-book ratio of 1.94.  The 
mean (median) lag from an insider sale and its public disclosure is 2.64 (2) trading days.  
Although timely within the required ASX five business days, it also reveals a further trading 
window to extract information from information search or tipping.  
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
Panels B-D provide a breakdown based on the size of insider sales, expressed as a 
percentage of shares outstanding.  The top 30 percent is classified as large insider sales, with 
the medium 40 percent, and the bottom 30 percent respectively defined as medium and small 
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insider sales.  These subsample descriptive statistics reveal that large insider sales tend to be 
conducted in small firms (average firm size $199 million).  The size of insider sales does not 
appear to be conditioned on the growth prospects of firms, since the mean market-to-book 
ratios of the three groups is close (3.24 vs 3.22 vs 3.33).  The disclosure lag reporting of 
insider sales is similar across the three subsamples, ranging from 2.31 to 3.41 trading days.  
Finally, the number of shares outstanding coincides with average firm size, with large insider 
sales clustering in small firms that have the least number of shares on issue. 
4.2 Results 
Abnormal short sales around insider selling  
The short selling pattern for the aggregate sample around all insider sales with a [-10, +10] 
trading day event window is shown in Figure 1.  Daily abnormal short sales, as the ratio of 
shares outstanding reach its peak at 0.0095 (significant at 5%) on the day an insider sells and 
decreases to 0.0057 (significant at 10%) one day after the insider sale.  The short selling 
activity then drops monotonically in the subsequent 5 days.  These preliminary aggregate 
results indicate that in Australia short sellers may only mimic inside sales, in contrast to the 
results of both front-running and mimicking found in the U.S.  However, as we argue in the 
introduction, this aggregated result may not hold for all insider trading and we now turn to 
short selling around large insider sales as events that hold significantly greater information 
content.  
[Insert Figure 1 About Here] 
The daily abnormal short sales clustered around insider sales of different sizes are 
reported in Table 3.7  Our expectation is that large insider selling contains significantly 
                                                          
7 To conserve space, from Table 3 afterwards, we only show the [-5, +5] results as the other days in the [-10, 
+10] window exhibit insignificant results.   
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greater information content and this will pre-focus greater short selling research and attention 
to insider trading.  This is the case with abnormal front-running occurs at days -3 and -2 and 
also significant mimic short selling on days 0, 1, 2, and 3.  These results supports the 
argument that large insider sales encompass larger information content (Seyhun, 1986; Scott 
and Xu, 2004), of higher quality (McNally et al., 2015), and short sellers both anticipate and 
closely follow large insider transactions (Khan and Lu, 2013).   
For medium insider sale volumes, there is no significant pattern of increased short 
selling.  For small insider sales, the evidence is confined to abnormal short selling on the day 
of insider trades.  In short, small and medium insider sales provide little trading interest from 
short sellers.  In consequence, we now have a situation where short sellers both front-run and 
mimic insider selling and this provides limited attainment for our research objectives.  Given 
one objective is to inform investors of specific negative information channels, we now turn to 
the analysis of opaque accounting variables.   
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
Abnormal short sales around accounting variables 
Table 4 tabulates these results.  With respect to the market-to-book ratio (M/B), there is no 
evidence that abnormal short sales front-run insider sales.  They occur contemporaneously on 
the day of the insider sale in low M/B value firms (0.0089, t=2.17), with lagged one day 
trading (0.0057, t=1.88), and contemporaneously for growth stocks (0.0342, t=1.74).  This 
result is consistent with a mimic hypothesis and affirm that value and growth stocks are 
generally not easy to value by outsiders compared to the information advantages endowed on 
corporate insiders.   
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
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We next comment on results from conditional short selling based on the level of 
intangibles and accruals.  In terms of intangibles, significant abnormal short sales are 
observed on the day of and one day after the insider sales for high intangibles firms.  These 
findings are consistent with prior evidence that shows a positive correlation between 
intangibles and an insider’s information advantage (Aboody and Lev, 2000), and that short 
sellers react to this as a primary information event and undertake a mimic strategy.  In 
contrast, there is no evidence of abnormal short selling for firms with low intangibles 
affirming there is little information interest for short sellers.   
Turning to accruals, high accruals that significantly increase income above cash from 
operations tend not to be persistent and are likely to mean revert to lower levels in subsequent 
periods.  They also tend not to be well understood by the market—treated as income similar 
to cash income, with corporate insiders expected to have the dominant asymmetric 
knowledge of quality (Sloan, 1996; Hodgson and van Praag, 2006).  However, Table 4 
reports that abnormal short sales in high accrual firms significantly front-run insider selling—
short sellers front-run insiders in high accruals firms from day [-5] to day [-2].  Given this 
result contradicts the front-running direction of our accrual hypothesis, in untabulated results 
we further explore short selling on high accruals by checking abnormal trading around all 
insider sales.  We also find front-running by short sellers up to five days before small insider 
trades.   
We offer two possible explanations.  If insiders intend to sell on manipulated accruals 
that increase earnings then this action, if discovered, would attract unwanted attention.  In 
this case, insidersmight have an incentive to tip short sellers to increase liquidity trading.  
Second, short sellers may have a perceptive awareness of this accounting attribute with a 
possible advantage acquired by industry wide comparison, exacerbated by the reticence of 
insiders to pre-sell on prior manipulated accruals.  In contrast, low accrual firms tend to 
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report income closer to cash flows and contain smaller negative information content.  In this 
case, short sellers mimic insiders (0.0070, t=1.95) on the day of insider sales.  
5. Further Analyses 
5.1  Economic Impact Analysis 
After establishing abnormal trading patterns from short sellers we now determine economic 
consequences by examining if trading volume transforms into profitability.  There is limited 
research that extends abnormal short selling trading metrics to price impact with results, 
confined to the U.S.  They show both insiders and short sellers extract post trading profits.  
For example, Massa et al. (2015) report that high levels of potential short selling trading (in 
terms of lendable shares),  enhances the raw return predictability of insider sales over the 
following month.  Khan and Lu (2013) report 20 day negative returns of 3% from insider 
sales in firms with high accounting information asymmetry. 
 In analysing price impact we draw on empirical research that establishes insiders as 
contrarian traders who reverse the trajectory of past returns, sending signals that prices are 
under or overvalued (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005).  Our prediction is that front-running by 
short sellers and mimic trading, in combination with the requirement for daily reporting 
through RG196, will increase competitive pressure and contribute to price efficiency.  This 
could be done in two ways.  Front-running would pre-release negative information and 
dampen subsequent returns from insider selling.  If short sellers are mimic traders the 
immediate reporting requirement in Australia should also limit the ability of inside sellers to 
subsequently profit.   
To examine profitability around insider sales, we calculate cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) we apply the market-adjusted returns model as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑚,𝑡,                                                              (5) 
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where 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the abnormal return for security i on day t; 𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the realised return for 
security i on day t and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the realised return for the market on day t.  AR’s are then 
cumulated and averaged across stocks:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (𝑡1,𝑡2) =
1
𝑁
 ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 (𝑡1,𝑡2)
𝑁
𝑖=1
,                                                (6) 
where 𝑡1 is the initial event date in the event window; 𝑡2 is the final event date in the event 
window and 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (𝑡1,𝑡2)  is the average cumulative abnormal returns from 𝑡1  to 𝑡2 , with 
statistical significance tested as follows: 
𝑡𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 (𝑡1,𝑡2) =
 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (𝑡1,𝑡2)
𝜎(𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 (𝑡1,𝑡2))
√𝑁
,                                                    (7) 
where 𝑡𝐶𝐴𝑅  is the t-statistic for average cumulative abnormal returns and 𝜎(𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 (𝑡1,𝑡2)) is 
the standard deviation of the average cumulative abnormal returns over the period 𝑡1 to 𝑡2.  
CARs are reported over three trading periods; [-10, 0], [0, +10] and to [0, +20] to replicate 
one month post insider large sales.  
Results are reported in Table 5.  The first result of note is that trading on negative news 
does not result in significant negative post insider traded returns.  That is, the combination of 
front-running and mimic competition appears to constrain insider rent extraction.  The other 
major result is that in all cases (except intangibles) the combination of short selling and 
insider sales imparts a significant contrarian trend that abates pre-traded positive returns.  The 
impact can be substantial.  For example, low accrual (6.75%), high accrual (6.10%), and low 
M/B (5.68%) firms.   
In summary there are two strong takeaways.  First, trading on negative news by short 
sellers and insiders does not transfer into significant or substantial negative returns post 
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insider trading.  Second, the major price impact is a contrarian termination of prior positive 
returns which provides a strong signal of prior over-pricing.  
5.2  Industry Analysis 
Accounting analysis concentrates on trading publicly available information which is less 
sensitive to regulatory censure.  We next examine trading where corporate insiders might 
have a greater reluctance to trade on firms that have a politically sensitive profile.  
Underlying this analysis is the observation that, whilst the litigation environment in Australia 
is not as arduous as the U.S., none-the-less, insider selling still attracts negative media and 
regulatory attention.  If this is the case then corporate insiders have incentives to delay 
trading and create an increased liquidity environment consistent with tipping and information 
leakage theories.   
 We first examine the financial sector.  The operations of financial firms are complex, 
covering such areas as mortgage lending, business lending, foreign exchange operations, 
hedging with derivative instruments, and trading in collateral debt obligations.  On the face of 
it this complexity provides corporate insiders with a comparative valuation advantage over 
market investors, especially in the case of assessing the loan book and trading in complex 
derivative securities (Flannery et al., 2004; Ryan et al. 2016).  However, the financial 
industry is heavily regulated and has a high public and political profile which might mitigate 
against an insiders proclivity to undertake a trading advantage.   
Another industry that is significant to Australia is the mining industry which 
witnessed a price slump in the ASX 300 Metals and Mining Index of over 69% during our 
research period8 with a contagion effect across the whole economy.  Mining operations are 
also complex with most of the asset value underground in estimated reserves with valuation 
                                                          
8 The ASX300 Metal and Mining Index fell by 61% from 5130 (March 2011) to 3184 (March 2013).   
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heavily based on volatile macro factors such as international economic growth.  In addition, 
the mining industry attracts significant media attention in Australia.   
We repeat the front-running and return analyses for these two industries and in 
untabulated results we find no front-running by short sellers.  In Financial firms, there is no 
abnormal short trading before large insider sales nor any evidence of abnormal returns.  For 
mining firms there is mimic trading on the day an insider sells (0.011, t=2.23), and evidence 
of contrarian trading.  In short, there is no strong support for a front-running hypothesis.  We 
can only surmise that operations in these industries are far too complex for short traders to 
interpret as argued by Cziraki (2017) and Adams et al. (2012), or that political sensitivity and 
the clear and rapid reporting requirement inhibits negative trading. 
5.3  Multiple Factor Analysis  
It is likely that value/growth, accounting ratios and industry are not independent.  In order to 
analyse the influence of all these variables on short sellers’ behaviour around insider sales, 
we conduct a multiple factor analysis (MFA).  With MFA, we simplify the complex and 
diverse relationship among the variables of interest by uncovering the common 
dimensions/factors that link them together (Alli et al., 1993).  Figure 2 reports the results.  
We observe that the first two factors explain almost 60% of the variability (41.55% and 16.17% 
respectively).  Day [0] has the highest coordinate on the first factor whereas day [2] is most 
highly related to the second factor.  This confirms that, in the majority of cases, short sellers 
undertake mimic trading.   
6. Conclusion 
We examine abnormal short selling around corporate insider sales in the Australian stock 
market.  The purpose is to identify negative information trading channels whereby investors 
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can identify overpricing or portending price declines.  In contrast with the U.S. studies of 
Khan and Lu (2013) and Massa et al. (2015), we find little substantial evidence that short 
selling front-runs insider selling in Australia, or that insider selling earns subsequent 
abnormal returns.  The dominant result is that short sellers primarily exhibit mimic behaviour 
on the day of large insider selling.  Results are robust to trading on opaque accounting 
variables, politically sensitive industries and multiple factor analysis.  The one channel that 
induces significant front-running by short sellers is high accrual firms, explained by a 
possible reluctance to highlight prior accrual manipulation.   
The lack of front-running by short sellers in Australia can be explained by a 
commercial business environment that more insulates the natural information advantages of 
corporate insiders.  In the U.S., the litigious environment inhibits front-running by insiders 
and induces an environment that encourages tipping and information transfer to short sellers 
who have lagged monthly reporting requirements.  The intention is to increase trading 
volumes and deflect attention away from subsequent large insider selling.  Compared to the 
U.S., Australia has a less litigious commercial environment, and lower short selling volumes 
with daily reporting requirements under RG196.   
There are two major price implications.  A first order impact is that the combination 
of abnormal short selling with large insider sales results in insignificant post traded abnormal 
returns—in other words, corporate insiders are constrained from rent extracting.  A secondary 
impact, is that contemporary abnormal short selling with large insider sales, results in a 
substantial contrarian price dampening signal to markets.  Results also indicate the 
effectiveness of the daily reporting requirements of RG196 in providing competitive and 
rapid price signals—effectively reducing insider monopoly power and inducing larger trading 
blocks (per Kyle, 1985).  Finally, we emphasise that results shed light on information 
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channels that alert investors to negative information and the role changes in the commercial 
and legal business environment play in diverting information cues.   
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Appendix 1: Regulatory Regimes on Short Selling in Australia 
Category Before the GFC After the GFC 
Regulation guidance  s1020B of the Corporations Act 2001  Regulatory Guide 196: Short Selling 
Shortable stocks  
 Covered short sales permitted for all stocks. 
 Naked short sales permitted if they are in the approved short 
sales list or arrangements have been made to deliver the stocks 
within 3 days after the short sale.  
 Abolishment of approved list of short products. 
 Any stock can be short sold as long as there is supply. 
 Only covered short sales permitted. 
 
Reporting frequency 
 Daily short position reporting which must be done by the next 
trading day. 
 Commencement of the reporting regime on July 2001.  
 Daily short transaction reporting which must be done by the 
next trading day. 
 Daily short position reporting which must be done within 
three trading days9. 
Short sales limit 
 Outstanding short sales volume to be <10% of total shares 
volume.  
 No limitations on the volume of stocks that can be short sold. 
This table presents the comparison of short selling regulations in Australia before and after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). 
 
                                                          
9 Based on RG 196.127 released by ASIC, relief is granted to sellers from reporting a short position if the short position as at 7 pm on a particular day is  <$100,000 and less 
than 0.01% of total shares issued. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
32 
 
Table 1: Sample Filtering for Insider Sales Associated with Short Selling 
 
Type of transaction  Number of observations 
Insider sale transactions  1,958 
Sample exclusions   
Not matched with short selling in window -393  
Takeovers -61  
Off-market transactions -217  
Option related -65  
Trades not made by directors -182  
Final matched sample   1,039 
This table records the data selection over the period January 2010 to March 2013. The final matched sample is 
for insider sales with short selling that occurs in a twenty one day window, i.e. ten days before/after the day of 
the insider sale.   
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Full Insider Sales Sample (Number of Firm-Events: 1,039) 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Firm Size ($’000) 1,923,378 152,075 7,523,716 
Size of Insider Sales (%) 0.97 0.11 4.72 
Market-to-book ratio 3.24 1.94 5.24 
Short Sales on Day of Insider Sales (%) 0.03 0.02 0.14 
Lag between Insider Sale and Disclosure (trading days) 2.64 2 7.33 
Shares Outstanding (‘000) 318,640 156,197 474,420 
Panel B: Small Insider Sales Only (Number of Firm-Events: 311) 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Firm Size ($’000) 5,610,100 702,492 12,976,303 
Size of Insider Sales (%) 0.20 0.02 2.84 
Market-to-book ratio 3.24 1.875 7.21 
Short Sales on Day of Insider Sales (%) 0.06 0.02 0.16 
Lag between Insider Sale and Disclosure (trading days) 3.41 2 11.30 
Shares Outstanding (‘000) 514,709 253,123 669,528 
Panel C: Medium Insider Sales Only (Number of Firm-Events: 416) 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Firm Size ($’000) 460,661 132,567 1,036,884 
Size of Insider Sales (%) 0.28 0.11 1.88 
Market-to-book ratio 3.22 2.08 4.53 
Short Sales on Day of Insider Sales (%) 0.02 0.02 0.07 
Lag between Insider Sale and Disclosure (trading days) 2.31 2 5.45 
Shares Outstanding (‘000) 245,081 139,625 313,983 
Panel D: Large Insider Sales Only (Number of Firm-Events: 312) 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Firm Size ($’000) 198,762 40,461 463,721 
Size of Insider Sales (%) 2.65 0.79 7.59 
Market-to-book ratio 3.33 2.07 3.63 
Short Sales on Day of Insider Sales (%) 0.02 
 
0.016 0.18 
 
Lag between Insider Sale and Disclosure (trading days) 2.38 2 4.39 
Shares Outstanding (‘000) 221,278 123,591 342,987 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for all directors’ sales from January 2010 - March 2013. Panels B, C 
and D report the descriptive statistics for small, medium and large insider sales, respectively. Small (large) 
insider sales are defined as the bottom (top) 30 percent of the insider sales as a percent of shares outstanding 
with medium insider sales defined as the middle 40 percent. Firm size is market capitalisation of firms at the end 
of the Australian financial year (30th June). Size of insider sales is shares sold by the director as a percent of 
shares outstanding. Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of equity divided by the book value of 
equity at the end of the financial year. Short Sales on Day of Insider Sales is the number of shares shorted on the 
day of the insider sale as a percent of shares outstanding. The Lag between Insider Sale and Disclosure is the 
delay in the disclosure of insider sales and its execution. 
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Table 3: Daily Abnormal Short Sales Conditioned on Insider Sale Trade Size 
Event Day  Large insider sales  Medium insider sales  Small insider sales 
 Abnormal Short Sales t-stat  Abnormal Short Sales t-stat  Abnormal Short Sales t-stat 
-5  0.0006 0.70  -0.0067* -1.75  0.0019 0.51 
-4  0.0004 0.36  0.0008 0.18  0.0055 1.17 
-3  0.0036* 1.88  -0.0006 -0.14  0.0018 0.61 
-2  0.0031* 1.80  -0.0033 -0.84  0.0044 1.31 
-1  0.0147 1.32  -0.0002 -0.04  0.0038 1.00 
0  0.0173* 1.69  -0.0003 -0.06  0.0148** 2.31 
1  0.0061* 1.77  -0.0010 -0.23  0.0143 1.64 
2  0.0050** 2.14  0.0009 0.23  0.0090 1.06 
3  0.0027* 1.72  0.0037 0.69  0.0078 0.92 
4  0.0017 1.19  0.0041 0.83  -0.0020 -0.82 
5  0.0011 0.97  -0.0027 -0.68  -0.0011 -0.20 
Number of Insider Sale Events  312  416  311 
This table reports the daily abnormal short sales (measured as a ratio of shares outstanding) within [-5, +5] trading days of insider sales of 
different sizes. Abnormal short sales around an insider sale event is the difference between the daily short sales on a particular day during the [-5, 
+5] trading day event window and the mean daily short sales estimated from a [-60, -11] trading day estimation window. The average daily 
abnormal short sales is calculated by averaging all the firms’ abnormal short sales. Large, medium and small insider sales are defined as the top 30 
percent, middle 40 percent and bottom 30 percent, respectively, of insider sales as a percent of firm market value in the full sample. *, ** and *** 
denote two-tailed statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4: Daily Abnormal Short Sales Conditioned on Publicly Available Market Information  
Event Day 
 Low M/B Firms  High M/B Firms  High Intangibles  Low Intangibles  High Accruals  Low Accruals 
 Abnormal 
Short Sales 
t-stat  Abnormal 
Short Sales 
t-stat  Abnormal 
Short Sales 
t-stat  Abnormal 
Short Sales 
t-stat  Abnormal 
Short Sales 
t-stat  Abnormal 
Short Sales 
t-stat 
-5  0.0016 1.47  0.0058 0.57  0.0037 0.45  0.0043 1.49  0.0158* 1.68  0.0013 0.81 
-4  0.0019 0.84  0.0074 0.78  -0.0025 -0.32  -0.0004 -0.17  0.0127* 1.89  -0.0010 -0.50 
-3  0.0068 1.57  0.0077 1.03  -0.0042 -0.79  0.0073 0.88  0.0095* 1.91  0.0025 1.13 
-2  0.0036 1.56  0.0104 1.34  0.0000 0.00  -0.0004 -0.14  0.0110** 2.45  0.0040 1.10 
-1  0.0076 1.64  0.0062 1.06  0.0098 0.60  0.0085 1.02  0.0047 1.53  0.0006 0.41 
0  0.0089** 2.17  0.0342* 1.74  0.0192** 2.20  0.0066 1.42  0.0126** 2.27  0.0070* 1.95 
1  0.0057* 1.88  0.0351 1.26  0.0172* 1.82  0.0062 1.11  0.0010 0.37  0.0012 0.66 
2  0.0091 1.54  0.0310 1.14  -0.0062 -0.83  0.0080 1.28  -0.0003 -0.08  -0.0007 -0.42 
3  0.0020 0.92  0.0210 0.79  0.0049 0.44  0.0110 1.34  0.0006 0.19  0.0024 0.95 
4  0.0006 0.83  -0.0006 -0.10  0.0081 1.24  0.0004 0.46  0.0005 0.14  0.0010 0.64 
5  0.0008 0.56  0.0087 0.53  -0.0044 -0.65  0.0032 1.27  -0.0030 -1.12  0.0000 0.01 
This table reports daily abnormal short sales (measured as a ratio of shares outstanding) based on market-to-book ratio, intangibles and accruals within [-5, +5] trading 
days of insider sales using the sample of large insider sales only. Abnormal short sales around an insider sale event is the difference between the daily short sales on a 
particular day during the [-5, +5] trading day event window and mean daily short sales estimated from the [-60, -11] trading day estimation window. The average daily 
abnormal short sales is calculated by averaging all the firms’ abnormal short sales. High (Low) M/B, intangible and accrual firms are defined as the top (bottom) 30 
percent based on the firm’s relevant ratio in the sample of large insider sales only. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5: Profitability of Insider Sales 
Panel A: Profitability around Insider Sales based on Trading and Market Characteristics: 
Trading period 
 
Full Sample 
 
Large Insider Sales 
 
High M/B ratio 
 
Low M/B Ratio 
 
CAR  t-stat 
 
CAR  t-stat 
 
CAR  t-stat 
 
CAR  t-stat 
[-10,-1] 
 
2.55*** 5.48 
 
4.60*** 3.97 
 
2.76** 2.01 
 
6.76** 2.29 
[0,+10] 
 
-0.30 -0.76 
 
-0.90 -1.01 
 
0.97 0.74 
 
-0.96 -0.54 
[0,+20] 
 
0.00 0.12 
 
0.30 0.46 
 
0.81 0.89 
 
1.08 0.83 
Short sellers Mimic  Mimic and front-run  Mimic  Mimic  
Panel B: Profitability around Insider Sales based on Accounting Characteristics: Large Insider Sales 
Trading period 
 
High Intangibles 
 
Low Intangibles 
 
High Accruals 
 
Low Accruals 
 
CAR  t-stat 
 
CAR  t-stat 
 
CAR  t-stat 
 
CAR  t-stat 
[-10,-1] 
 
0.19 0.13 
 
2.22 1.00 
 
6.04*** 2.98 
 
7.28** 2.37 
[0,+10] 
 
0.29 0.17 
 
-0.91 -0.57 
 
-2.3 -1.02 
 
-1.02 -0.57 
[0,+20] 
 
1.13 0.98 
 
0.37 0.30 
 
-0.06 -0.04 
 
0.53 0.40 
Short sellers Mimic  None  Front-run  Mimic  
This table reports average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around insider sales in the [-10, -1], [0, +10] and [0, +20] trading windows based on market characteristics 
(Panel A) and accounting characteristics (Panel B). Large insider sales is defined as the top 30 percent of insider sales as a percent of firm market value in the full sample.  *, 
** and *** denotes two-tailed statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  The bottom row (short sellers) notes whether short abnormal trading is generally 
categorised as front-running, mimicking, or no significance. 
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Figure 1: Daily Abnormal Short Sales around Insider Selling 
 
This figure presents the average daily abnormal short sales (expressed as a ratio of shares outstanding) around [-10, +10] trading days when an insider sells.  Abnormal 
short sales are calculated as the difference between daily short sales and the mean daily short sales estimated from the [-60, -11] trading day estimation window.  
Significance is recorded at time (0) (µ= 0.0095, t=2.36) and time +1 (µ= 0.0057, t=1.74). 
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Figure 2: Multiple Factor Analysis of Abnormal Short Sales around Insider Sales 
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Highlights for “Insider Sales vs. Short Sellers: Negative Information Trading in Australia”: 
 Short sellers in the main mimic large insider sales. 
 Our results contradict front-running by short sellers in the U.S. 
 The different commercial and legal environment in Australia explains the results. 
 Insider sales and short selling does not result in abnormal returns. 
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